Mr Yerima Lawan, Maduri councilor and his masked legal affairs procurators have laid out a passionate constitutional case, and I respect the legal fervor. But let me respond in kind, point by point, tone for tone; because you’ve mistaken the existence of constitutional rights for the erasure of private moral obligations.

First, no one disputes the supremacy of the Nigerian Constitution. But supremacy does not mean exclusivity. The Constitution guarantees Hon. Kalallawa’s right to contest, nobody is arguing for physical or legal barring from the ballot. The question is whether he can voluntarily, knowingly, and publicly bind himself to an agreement not to contest, and then later claim constitutional immunity from the consequences of his own word. That is not a constitutional defense; that is convenient amnesia dressed in judicial robes.

Mr Yerima Lawan, Maduri councilor and his masked legal affairs procurators have laid out a passionate constitutional case, and I respect the legal fervor. But let me respond in kind, point by point, tone for tone; because you’ve mistaken the existence of constitutional rights for the erasure of private moral obligations.

1. ON CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY & PRIVATE AGREEMENTS

Yes, Section 1(1) reigns supreme. But Section 1 does not outlaw private political pacts. It voids laws inconsistent with the Constitution, not voluntary undertakings between political actors. If every agreement that touched on political behavior were automatically void, then party candidacy withdrawal pledges, zoning arrangements, and even the APC’s own internal nomination consent forms would be dead letters. They are not. Why? Because rights can be waived, not absolutely, but voluntarily. Hon. Kalallawa was not coerced. He signed. The Constitution does not forbid a man from honoring his word.

2. ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Section 40 guarantees association—not immunity from the consequences of breaking a pact made within that association. He remains free to contest. No one is locking him up. But freedom does not mean freedom from political accountability. The people who signed alongside him relied on his undertaking. To now hide behind Section 40 is to convert a shield of liberty into a sword of betrayal.

3. LEGAL NULLITY?, VOID AB INITIO?

You call it void. But voidness is a judicial finding, not a political slogan. No court has pronounced this agreement void. And until one does, it stands as evidence of a moral and political compact. Even if unenforceable in court (which is debatable for contracts founded on mutual political consideration are not automatically anathema), enforceability is not the sole measure of obligation. Oaths, undertakings, and pacts in political life are often pre-legal, they bind because honor binds. To say “void ab initio” is to argue that no adult, no legislator, can ever voluntarily limit his electoral ambitions for the sake of collective interest. That is not democracy; that is anarchy dressed as principle.

4. ON POLITICAL HYPOCRISY AND BREACH BY SIGNATORIES

Here, you raise a legitimate point: if others breached first, why should Hon. Kalallawa alone be bound? That is fair, if the breach was material and if the agreement contemplated mutual performance. But two wrongs do not make a right. The proper response to bad faith by others is not to abandon one’s own oath; it is to call them out while still keeping your word, or to seek a mutual dissolution. Instead, the argument here is: “They cheated, so I am free to cheat.” That is not law. That is revenge. And revenge is not a moral foundation.

Moreover, the electoral sabotage you cite, if true, is condemnable. But those individuals are not before us. Hon. Kalallawa is. Their betrayal does not retroactively invalidate his signature. If anything, it makes his fidelity to the agreement more honorable, not less.

1. THE JONATHAN PRECEDENT

The Goodluck Jonathan example is inapt. Jonathan contested in 2015 despite an alleged zoning understanding within the PDP. But crucially, he did not sign a personal, dated, witnessed undertaking with twelve specific individuals explicitly agreeing not to contest. Equating a loose zoning convention with a signed political compact is comparing a handshake to a signed deed. Precedent without identical facts is not precedent, it is a metaphor.

2. THE RIGHT TO RECONTEST IS INVIOLABLE?

No. It is qualified by voluntary agreement. Rights can be waived—not fundamental human rights to life or liberty, but political rights to contest a specific seat under a specific party platform. He can still run. As an independent? Perhaps. As a different candidate? Yes. But to run against the very agreement he signed while remaining in the same political arrangement? That is not exercising a right. That is breaking a promise.

3. CONCLUSION: REJECTION OF POLITICAL INTIMIDATION?

Calling enforcement of a signed agreement “political intimidation” is rhetorical misdirection. Intimidation is a gun to the head. This is a piece of paper voluntarily signed. Hon. Kalallawa is not a victim of constitutional violation. He is a victim of his own signature, and the only honorable way out is not to invoke the Constitution as a fig leaf, but to publicly acknowledge the agreement, argue it is void if he wishes, and let his constituents judge whether a man’s word means anything.

MY TAKEAWAY:

You say the agreement is legally void. I say legal enforceability and moral obligation are siblings, not twins. Even if a court would never compel performance, a legislator who claims to represent the people must represent something higher than technicalities (i.e integrity and honoring one's own words). Hon. Kalallawa may have the right to run. But rights without honor are just rules for cowards. If he runs, he should do so openly admitting he signed and is walking away. Let Damaturu II decide whose constitution they trust more, the one in Abuja, or the one in a man’s word.

WARD 7 KARAYE POLITICAL VANGUARD